Afghanistan Part III – A Failure of Methodology

…Or How To Teach Someone Absolutely Nothing

“We need to let them fail.”  I said to my boss.  

Some people ask me what my job was over there.  I simply say – even to fellow veterans – that I was a Brigade XO.  Second in command.  And then everyone lets it go at that.  Saying I as a Brigade XO is so much easier than saying, “Deputy Commander of Region Support Command North (RSCN).”  Because then I’d feel obligated to give the definition and explain the function of a Regional Support Command, how it differs from a Regional Command, and how both nest into the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A – an acronym within an acronym), and how NTM-A nested within CENTCOM (ooh – another acronym).  Then of course, there was NTMA-A’s relationship with Untied States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), also under CENTCOM.  Two made-up commands with vaguely defined missions co-located under CENTCOM.  Wee

Back in 2010, the Gross Domestic Product of Afghanistan was somewhere close to 10 billion dollars, virtually all of which could be traced back to the U.S. taxpayer.  

Almost none of the wealth produced in Afghanistan (really Pashtunstan) came from the indigenous population.  These are not unskilled people.  There are plenty of shops along the roadsides. Everywhere one could see artisans working scrap metal (a resource in abundance), or mud bricks hardening in the sun. I saw countless retailers of food and electronic goods.  My duties prevented me from exploring the supply chain in depth. That would have been an interesting study. Absent was any method of recording transactions. No accountability, meant no method of auditing. Which of course meant no way for the government to collect revenue.

Experience Teaches. Failure Cements The Lesson Into One’s Brain.

I have noted here the vast resources of the region.  Central Asia sits on huge deposits of rare earths. These are the resources the world requires for composite materials, electronic components, and space exploration.  The region also sits on an ocean of natural gas.  I recall seeing exactly one natural gas plant in Kabul.

I am a firm believer that people get the government they deserve.  Afghanistan has never recovered from its disastrous flirtation with Marxism. They never got the chance. Combine that with its continued loving embrace of Islam (no, there is no such thing as “radical” Islam; there is only Islam) has led to its current state.

You cannot help people who will not do for themselves. Yet we insisted on propping up their government and economy. We prevented them from learning critical lessons. The result are crippling gaps in infrastructure. Crippling gaps in their manufacturing base, in their supply chain, and resource development. The failure of the Afghans was our failure, plain and simple. Going into denial serves no one.

This principle was the cornerstone of my discussion the RSC-N Commander.  This was ten years ago and already I could see that we were treating the Afghans like the mentally challenged.  Take note, that I didn’t say we were treating them like children.  No, we were treating them like our under-developed charges. Which made Afghanistan was one big community center

We expect children are to grow.  Everyone learns for themselves not to touch a hot stove.   Everyone falls down when the training wheels are taken off the bicycle.  Without out some discomfort, there is no progress.

I’ll touch on this further in the coming week.

Selah.

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About Phil Christensen

The trail behind me is littered with failure. The trail before me remains to be seen.
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